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Abstract
To engineer secure software, it is imperative to understand attackers’ perspectives and
approaches. This information has been captured by attack patterns. The Common Attack Patterns
Enumeration Classification (CAPEC) repository hosts over 450 attack patterns that contain
information about how attacks have been launched against software. Researches have indicated
that attack patterns can be utilized for developing secure software; however, there exists no
systematic methodology to address this concern. This research proposes a methodology for
utilizing CAPEC attack patterns for developing abuse cases at the requirements stage of the
secure software development lifecycle (SDLC). In previous research, a tool for retrieving attack
patterns (TrAP) was developed to retrieve CAPEC attack patterns according to Microsoft
STRIDE threat categories. This tool also features a search function using keywords. The
proposed methodology starts with a set of initial abuse cases developed through brainstorming.
Microsoft SDL threat modelling tool is then used to identify and rank possible security threats in
the system. The SDL tool generates a series of questions for each threat and these questions are
used to extract keywords that serve as input to the TrAP tool to retrieve attack patterns relevant
to the abuse cases. Keywords can also be system prerequisites or any technology being
implemented in the system. From the list of retrieved attack patterns, the most relevant attack
patterns are selected and used to extend the initial abuse cases. New abuse cases can also be
discovered through this process.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
To improve the security of computer systems, information, and the cyber space, it is
critical to engineer more secure software. Research has shown that the majority of the security
defects are due to known software defects. To develop secure and reliable software, software
developers must anticipate abnormal behavior. Therefore, software developers need to have the
mindset of an attacker (McGraw, 2006). Attack patterns are valuable resources to help software
developers to think like an attacker. Attack patterns capture attackers’ perspectives and
approaches used by attackers to exploit software. They are valuable resources to help software
developers to think like an attacker and have the potential to be used in each phase of the secure
software development life cycle. However, systematic processes or methods for utilizing existing
attack pattern resources for secure software development are needed.
The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) initiative
sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security and maintained by Cigital hosts over 450
attack patterns along with a comprehensive schema and classification taxonomy. CAPEC
however, is not easy to use, since users have to go through the whole list to get the attack pattern
they are looking for. This does not make using CAPEC for software development attractive to
developers. In our quest to improve the usability of the CAPEC library and make it more user
friendly, we proposed a methodology to utilize CAPEC to develop abuse cases.
This research describes our methodology of utilizing attack patterns for extending abuse
cases. Pauli & Xu (2005) described a use/misuse case model for Hospital Information System
(HIS) in their paper. We would extend their misuse cases using our approach. The most relevant
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attack patterns retrieved by the tool for retrieving CAPEC attack patterns would be further
refined and used for extending the abuse cases.
This methodology is utilized to develop abuse cases for a Hospital Information System
(HIS) described in (Pauli & Xu, 2005). Our case study demonstrates that the proposed
methodology could be used to select attack patterns to extend a set of initial abuse cases
generated through brainstorming and discover new abuse cases.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a literature review on
attack patterns and use and abuse cases, and also introduces Microsoft SDL threat modelling tool
and the tool for retrieving attack patterns (TrAP). Chapter 3 discusses the proposed methodology
for utilizing attack patterns to develop abuse cases. Chapter 4 describes how our proposed
methodology is used for developing abuse cases for HIS. Lastly, chapter 5 concludes the thesis
and raises concern for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
This chapter introduces the concept of attack patterns and how they are applied to secure
software development from various researchers point of view. The chapter also briefly
introduces the concept of use and abuse cases. Microsoft SDL threat modelling tool and the tool
for retrieving attack patterns (TrAP) are also introduced in this chapter.
2.1 Attack Patterns
Attack patterns generalize attacks employed by attackers on software systems. Though a
relatively new concept, attack patterns has received significant research attention in recent times
(Moore, Ellison, & Linger, 2001). Sethi and Barnum (2006) also illustrated that attack patterns
have the potential to be used in each phase of the SDLC, including requirement gathering,
architecture and design, implementation and coding, as well as testing. A number of researches
that have focused on attack patterns and how they are related to this work are discussed below.
Hoglund and McGraw (2004) described 49 attack patterns in their book “Exploiting
Software: How to Break Code”. Sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security, the
ongoing Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) initiative collects a
set of publicly available core attack patterns along with a comprehensive schema and
classification taxonomy. Currently CAPEC includes over 450 attack patterns contributed by the
community.
Sethi and Barnum (2006) illustrated using examples how attack patterns can be utilized in
each phase of the SDLC, a systematic process or method of utilizing existing attack patterns to
develop secure software is lacking. There is little research on how to use attack patterns such as
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CAPEC in the secure software development life cycle. Towards utilizing CAPEC information
for secure software development.
Pauli and Engebretson (2008a) proposed a prototype tool that retrieves related CAPEC
attack patterns based on system prerequisites user inputs to the tool. The attack patterns and
mitigation strategies for the attack patterns presented to the user can be used during system
design and implementation. The prerequisites include hardware, operating system, server
configuration and programming language.
Gegick and Williams (2005) constructed 53 attack patterns that can be used for
identifying security vulnerabilities during software design. These attack patterns were developed
based on four existing vulnerability databases. These attack patterns were represented using
regular expressions to encapsulate the steps that can be used to attack the software application.
These attack patterns were used to identify vulnerabilities via matching a sequence of elements
in a system design that permits the sequence of events in the attack pattern to occur. They used
attack patterns to identify security vulnerabilities, we map CAPEC attack patterns to STRIDE
(Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of
Privilege) to develop abuse cases.
Pauli and Engebretson (2008b) developed an approach for teaching attack patterns based
on a hierarchy to present information logically. This hierarchy includes the following levels of
abstraction from highest to lowest: vulnerability, attack pattern, exploit, bug and flaw, activation
zone, injection vector, payload, and reward. Students were asked to map CAPEC Release 1 to
the abstraction levels of this hierarchy. The objective of this work is to assist students to learn
and retain information on attack patterns through the mapping process. They mapped attack
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patterns to abstraction level for teaching, we mapped attack patterns to STRIDE to retrieve
relevant attack patterns from CAPEC to develop abuse case.
Barnum and Sethi (2007) give a general overview of the structure and content of attack
patterns and explain how they can be applied in each stage of the secure software development
lifecycle. They explained in detail the concept of CAPEC attack patterns with examples to show
their usage as well.
Wiesauer and Sametinger (2009) developed a taxonomy for security design patterns
using attack patterns. In their taxonomy, they described a criteria for selecting attack patterns
based on security requirements. The purpose of the taxonomy was to help users see relevant
security design patterns when selecting attack patterns. Their work assigned security design
patterns to CAPEC attack patterns and employs the STRIDE model to group attacks into
different categories to classify security patterns, while our work maps CAPEC attack patterns to
STRIDE for developing abuse cases.
McGraw (2006) mentioned in his book that attack patterns can be used for developing
abuse cases, however, he did not discuss an approach to select and use relevant attack patterns
for developing abuse cases. Our work introduces an approach for selecting and utilizing CAPEC
attack patterns for developing abuse cases.
2.2 Use and Abuse/Misuse Cases
Use case is a functional description of how a user might interact with a system.
McDermott & Fox (1999) classifies it as an abstract episode of interaction between a system and
its environment. Use cases are represented by UML diagrams and their descriptions. It tells what
the system is intended to be used for, thereby leveraging functional requirements. They describe
the system’s behavior under normal expected use conditions. However, when the system is used
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in an inappropriate way (abused), we need to have an idea of how the system may behave. This
introduces the concept of abuse/misuse cases.
Misuse case is a use case from an attacker perspective with the intent to harm the system
(Alexander, 2003). A misuse case might harm an actor of the system, a stakeholder or the system
itself (McDermott, & Fox, 1999). Misuse cases threaten use cases, it is considered as the
opposite form of a use case. Abuse cases serve as a support for developers and elicits security
requirements. Countermeasures are developed to mitigate misuse cases in the form of security
use cases (Tndel, et al. 2010) Some authors maintain a stand that abuse cases and misuse cases
are different. In this research however, abuse cases and misuse cases will be used
interchangeably and carry the same meaning.
Hope, McGraw & Anton (2004) stated informed brainstorming as the simplest, most
practical method for creating abuse cases.
McGraw (2006) discussed a process for developing abuse cases. It takes into account, a
set of requirements and standard use cases, and a list of attack patterns. This research focuses on
how to find relevant attack patterns from CAPEC, and how to use these attack patterns to extend
abuse cases and discover new abuse cases.
2.3 Microsoft SDL Threat Modelling
Software architectural risk analysis refers to the activity of identifying and ranking risks
applied to architecture and design-level artifacts. One risk analysis methodology is Microsoft’s
threat modeling (Meier et al. 2003; Hernan, et al. 2006). It is the process of hypothesizing
potential security threats, evaluating the threats, ranking the threats and suggesting mitigation
strategies. It includes the following steps: (1) Identify assets; (2) Create an architecture overview;
(3) Decompose the application; (4) Identify, document, and rate the threats. Threats are classified
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into six categories: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service,
and Elevation of privilege (STRIDE). Threats are ranked based on their Damage potential,
Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, and Discoverability (DREAD) (Meier et al.
2003; Hernan, et al. 2006).
Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle Threat Modeling Tool 3.1.8 is a free tool for
software developers and architects to identify possible security threats and mitigate potential
security risks. It is based on the Microsoft STRIDE framework. The tool requires architectural
information to develop data flow diagrams (DFD) and has the ability to analyze model, describe
environment and generate several reports. The steps of using Microsoft SDL threat modeling tool
3.1.8 are described below:
(1) Draw data flow diagram. The software system needs to first be decomposed into relevant
elements. Each element is analyzed for susceptibility to the threats. Data flow diagrams (DFDs)
are used to represent the decomposition of the system. Figure 1 shows an example DFD diagram
that the MSDL tool presents to users when the tool is ran. The DFDs comprises of the following
elements in relation to the elements of a system: data flows, data stores, processes, external
interactors, and trust boundaries (Hernan, et al. 2006).

Configuration

Commands
User

Data

My Process
Responses

Results

Figure 1. An Example Data Flow Diagram (DFD)
Data flows are represented by arrows and connect interactors, processes and data stores to
each other to show how data flows between the elements of the system. The data flows in figure
1 are “Commands”, “Responses”, “Configuration” and “Results”.
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Data stores represent storage repositories where data is stored in the system. They are
represented by two parallel lines with the name of the data store in-between the lines. In figure 1,
the data store is “Data”.
Processes are represented by circles in the DFD diagram. They represent some kind of
data processing or system configurations are done. The process in figure 1 is My Process. It takes
commands from the User and saves configuration to the Data.
External interactors are human users or non-human actors such as computers. They are
outside the system and interact in various ways with the system. They might have to cross certain
boundaries to interact with the system. They are represented by rectangular box. User is the
external interactor in figure 1. The commands coming from User cross a trust boundary
represented by a red dotted arc.
The system may comprise of one or more of the following boundaries: trust, machine,
process or other boundaries. These boundaries represent authentication and/or authorization and
may restrict access to certain areas in the system without authentication or certain resources
without authorization or both.
(2) Analyze model. This step of the Microsoft Threat Modeling process presents all the threat
types associated with all the elements of the DFD model to the developer. The elements refer to
the data flows, the processes, data store and interactors. For each element and for each threat
type to the element, the developer needs to consider a series of questions presented by the tool
and describe the threat impact and how to mitigate the threat. Table 1 illustrates a summary of
the threats that affect the various elements of the DFD.
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Table 1
Threats Affecting Elements (Hernan et al, 2006)

Element

Spoofing

Tampering

Information

Denial of

Elevation of

Disclosure

Service

Privilege

Repudiation

Data Flows (DF)

X

X

X

Data Stores (DS)

X

X

X

X

X

Processes (P)

X

Interactors (I)

X

X

X

X

X

(3) Describe environment. During this step, the developers note elements that the system is
linked to, especially third-party code, as well as assumptions made by the developers. The
developers also describe external security notes and document header information.
(4) Generate reports. This step generates several reports for the developer, such as “Bug Report”,
“Recommended Fuzzing”, “Analysis Report”, “Threat Model Report”, etc.
2.4 A Tool for Retrieving Attack Patterns (TrAP)
A tool for categorizing attack patterns based on Microsoft STRIDE framework was
developed by mapping attack patterns to STRIDE categories. Various textual values of
properties such as Severity, Completeness, Attacker Skills, Likelihood of Exploit and etc. were
converted to numerical values to calculate a metric for each attack pattern. The textual values
were in the form of high to low or very high to very low rankings. The conversions were as
follows: high in a textual context was converted to 3 in the numerical context, medium to 2, and
low to 1. Similarly, very high was converted to 5 and very low to 1. The tool calculates a metric
from these values and uses it to rank each attack pattern according to each particular STRIDE
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category. This ranking puts the attack patterns most relevant to a particular STRIDE category at
the top of the list of retrieved patterns.
TrAP is implemented in PHP and MySQL and is web-based for easy access (Figure 2
shows the interface of TrAP displaying retrieved attack patterns under the spoofing category).
TrAP is currently running on a localhost server and would be deployed soon to the internet. The
retrieved attack patterns are ranked from most relevant to least relevant under each STRIDE
category (Yuan et al., 2014).

Figure 2. Interface of TrAP Showing Attack Patterns Retrieved under Spoofing Threat
TrAP also features a keyword search that allows easy access to attack patterns containing
these type of words. The radio buttons in figure 2 are used to toggle between how a user would
like to search for patterns, either from the whole database or from a particular STRIDE type.
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Figure 3 shows the result of searching for attack patterns in TrAP using the keyword “session”
under the Spoofing threat category.

Figure 3. Using Keyword “session” to Retrieve Attack Patterns in TrAP
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CHAPTER 3
The Methodology for Using CAPEC Attack Patterns to Develop Abuse Cases
This chapter introduces our methodology for using CAPEC attack patterns to develop
abuse cases. The approach uses SDL threat modelling to assist in retrieving CAPEC attack
patterns most relevant to the system. These attack patterns are then used to extend a set of initial
abuse cases and discover new abuse cases. We use an example to illustrate the steps of this
methodology.
3.1 Methodology of Developing Abuse Cases Using CAPEC Attack Patterns
Figure 4 below describes the methodology of developing abuse cases using attack
patterns. Developers develop use cases and brainstorm abuse cases from the use cases
considering the behaviors of the users. Microsoft SDL threat modeling process is followed to
decompose the system architecture into elements and analyze each element for threats. This
process generates questions based on threat type per element. Keywords are extracted from the
questions generated to search for attack patterns using the tool for retrieving attack patterns
(TrAP). Keywords are also generated from the system architecture documentation considering
any technology being implemented in the system. Scanning through the list of attack patterns
generated by TrAP according to STRIDE should also be considered to select relevant attack
patterns that may be missed by keywords search. The retrieved attack patterns are then used to
extend the initially brainstormed abuse cases in and can sometimes introduce new abuse cases
that should be considered for the system.
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Output

Activity

Input

Develop Use
Cases

1

1

Use Cases

Requirements Team
2

2

Brainstorm Abuse
Case from
Behavior of Users

System
Architecture and
Design Documents

3

Run MSDL Tool

2

3

Abuse Cases

Architecture
components and
Questions
Generated by
Threat Type
6

4

Generate
Keywords

4

4

List of Keywords

5

Attack Patterns

5

Run Attack Pattern
Tool (TrAP)

5

List of Selected,
Ranked Attack
Patterns

6

Extend Abuse
Cases, Find new
Abuse Cases

6

Extended Abuse
Cases, New
Abuse Cases?

Figure 4. The Methodology for Developing Abuse Cases Using Attack Patterns
The detailed process depicted in Figure 4 is described below: The numbering in Figure 4
is in correspondence with the order of activity flow.
1. System architecture information is collected and used to develop use cases.
2. The system architecture information and the developed use cases are used in a brainstorming
process to develop initial abuse cases.
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3. The Microsoft SDL threat modelling tool is then ran to analyze threats that pertain to the
various elements of the system. This is done by first developing a DFD (data flow diagram)
from the system architecture and design documents. The elements of the system are external
interactors, processes, data flows and data stores. This process constitutes the architectural
risk analysis of the system and the output is a list of threats that pertain to the system
elements. The threat types are Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure,
Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege (STRIDE). The tool generates questions about
each threat type for each element of the system. These questions are used to extract keywords
for searching attack patterns in TrAP. The elements implement the use cases, which means
the elements have a direct relationship with the use cases and a corresponding relationship
with the abuse cases that threaten the use cases.
4. Keywords are extracted from the questions generated by the SDL tool and system
architecture documentation.
5. These keywords are used to search attack patterns in the Tool for Retrieving Attack Patterns
(TrAP) to select most relevant attack patterns by STRIDE category.
6. The selected attack patterns are used to extend the initially brainstormed abuse cases. The
retrieved attack patterns are ranked in order of relevance by the TrAP tool. Information used
for extending abuse cases is extracted from the “Description” and/or “Example Instance”
section of the attack pattern. The result of this exercise is a document of extended abuse
cases for the system under development. If there are too many abuse cases, remove the ones
with: 1.) Low likelihood of exploit, severity, attacker skills; 2.) Obsolete technology as attack
prerequisites and required resources; 3.) High attacker skills and knowledge required.
Document any new abuse cases that may be discovered during the process.
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The “Solutions and Mitigations” section of the attack patterns in conjunction with the
mitigations provided by the threat model analysis can be used to suggest a strong mitigation
strategy for the system. However mitigation strategies are out of scope of this research.
3.2 Illustrating the Methodology with an Example
In this section, we use an example Health Information System (HIS) based on work done
by Pauli & Xu (2005). In their paper, Pauli & Xu (2005) suggested an approach for design and
analysis of secure software systems based on use and misuse cases. They illustrated their
approach by performing a case study on a security-intensive hospital information system. We
will adopt their hospital information system as an example to illustrate our methodology. For the
purpose of clarification, we simplify the use and abuse case model of their example HIS.
The following sections introduce using the steps presented in Figure 4 to illustrate how to
develop abuse cases.
3.2.1 Use Cases for Doctor. The HIS has many users which may include secretaries,
nurses, doctors, pharmacists, IT personnel, business office personnel and administrative
personnel (Pauli & Xu 2005). These user have certain behaviors or interactions closely related to
the HIS security: 1) Secretary entering patient information; 2) Nurse entering preliminary
appointment information; 3) Doctor entering appointment findings; 4) Doctor transmitting
pharmacy orders to the pharmacy; 5) Pharmacist receiving pharmacy order. For the purpose of
this work, we consider only the doctor’s role of entering appointment findings which depends on
the nurse’s role of entering preliminary appointment information.
The users are given enough permissions to access data they need to execute their job or
parts of the system. The doctor is assigned the following tasks in HIS: 1) patient diagnoses; 2)
treatment prescription; 3) documenting details of the appointment findings into the HIS after the
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completion of an appointment; 4) entering pharmacy orders to be transmitted to the pharmacy;
and 5) setting the access levels for the nurses and secretaries. For the purpose of illustrating our
methodology, we select one use case based on which abuse cases are developed.
“Enter Appointment Findings” Use Case Description. The doctor logs in to HIS server
using a secure browser. The server authenticates the Doctor and opens a session for him. The
Doctor enters patient appointment findings and transmits pharmacy orders to the pharmacy, and
then logs out.
Abuse/misuse cases could be developed based on the interactions described in the above
description.
3.2.2 Abuse Cases for Doctor. An attacker may abuse HIS by changing the doctor’s
appointment findings. The attacker might do so by impersonating the doctor or by intercepting
data packets and analyzing them for further attacks. Figure 5 below shows the use-misuse case
model for the doctor. Use cases are represented by white ovals, black ovals represent abuse
cases.
3.2.3 Threat Modelling. Microsoft SDL tool is used for performing threat modelling
analysis to find threats pertaining to elements of a system. The system is decomposed into
elements to develop a data flow diagram (DFD). The elements are external interactors, data
flows, processes, and data stores. Figure 6 represents the DFD diagram of HIS. The diagram
depicts interactions between the doctor and the HIS system.
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Enter
Appointment
Findings

Threatens

Change
Doctor’s
Findings
Includes

Doctor

Includes

Hacker

Intercept and
Analyze Packets

Impersonate
Doctor

Figure 5. Doctor use & misuse case model in HIS
Update (U)
Enter (E)
Findings Data
(FD)

Findings (F)

Doctor (D)
Retrieve (R)

View (V)

Figure 6. Data Flow Diagram (DFD) for HIS
In Figure 6, the doctor has the ability to enter or retrieve appointment findings after he is
successfully authenticated and authorized (red dashed line represents authentication and
authorization) by the system. The Findings process takes the data from doctor, processes it and
sends to the findings data store. The arrows show the data flow between the doctor, the Findings
process and the data store.
Figure 7 shows the interface of the SDL tool where the threats are generated for each
element. The “Analyze Model” stage of the SDL generates threats accompanied by questions
that address it each threat. The same threats pertains to elements of the same type (as
summarized by Table 1 in section 2.3).
Figure 8 is a closer look at the questions posed by the tool for the Spoofing threat under
the Findings element.

19

Figure 7. MSDL Interface Showing Threats and Questions Generated By Tool for Each Threat

Figure 8. Closer Look at Questions Generated by MSDL Threat Modeling Tool for Spoofing
Threat of the Findings Process.
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3.2.4 Generate Keywords. The questions presented by the SDL tool serve as a useful
resource for extracting keywords used to search for most relevant CAPEC attack patterns. The
keywords may range from words to phrases based on the developer’s discretion. These extracted
keywords are input to the Tool for Retrieving Attack Patterns (TrAP) to search for attack
patterns related to the security concern the Microsoft SDL tool tries to address. The most related
attack patterns would be used in extending the abuse cases.
For our example, the keywords extracted from figure 8 include: spoofing, credentials,
key, cryptography, password, and authentication.
3.2.5 Searching Relevant Attack Patterns using the Tool for Retrieving Attack
Patterns (TrAP). TrAP retrieves the most relevant attack patterns from highest to lowest
rankings by STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of
Service and Elevation of Privilege) category.
Each keyword found from threat modeling was input in the TrAP tool to retrieve a set of
CAPEC attack patterns. We combine all the attack patterned retrieved from all the keywords,
eliminating duplicates and less relevant ones (those with little or no detailed information). For
our example, the resulting attack patterns are listed in Table 2.
Table 2
List of Selected Attack Patterns for Spoofing Findings Process using Keywords generated by
SDL Tool
CAPEC

Attack Pattern Name

ID
21

Exploitation of Session Variables; Resource IDs and other Trusted Credentials

60

Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)

21
Table 2
Cont.
59

Session Credential Falsification through Prediction

37

Lifting Data Embedded in Client Distributions

196

Session Credential Falsification through Forging

98

Phishing

107

Cross Site Tracing

57

Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Register Man in the Middle
Lifting credential(s)/key material embedded in client distributions (thick or
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thin)

90

Reflection Attack in Authentication Protocol

70

Try Common(default) Usernames and Passwords

199

Cross-Site Scripting Using Alternate Syntax

69

Target Programs with Elevated Privileges

68

Subvert Code-signing Facilities

97

Cryptanalysis

112

Brute Force

49

Password Brute Forcing

55

Rainbow Table Password Cracking

16

Dictionary-based Password Attack

50

Password Recovery Exploitation

57

Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Register Man in the Middle

114

Authentication Abuse

22
Table 2
Cont.
11

Cause Web Server Misclassification

136

LDAP Injection

83

XPath Injection

39

Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens

22

Exploiting Trust in Client (aka Make the Client Invisible)

207

Removing Important Functionality from the Client

5

Analog In-band Switching Signals (aka Blue Boxing)

3.2.6 Selecting Attack Patterns for extending an Abuse Case. In this section, attack
patterns that are relevant to an abuse case are selected from the list in Table 2. At this point the
table contains attack patterns that are relevant to the specific category of threat, however, the
following points needs to be considered in order to select relevant attack patterns for developing
a specific abuse case:
1. The motivation of the attack pattern should be similar or match the objective of the abuse
case.
2. Any technology implemented by the software should be compared with the prerequisites of
the attack pattern to ensure the right attack pattern is selected for developing abuse case for
that technology.
3. The resources required by the attack pattern should be compared with the resources required
by the abuse case to ensure that the resources required by the attack patterns are not obsolete
compared to that required by the abuse case.
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4. Attacker skills, likelihood of exploit and severity of the attack pattern should be taken into
consideration to determine whether it is suitable for developing abuse case.
For example, for the abuse case “Impersonate Doctor”, we select the following attack
patterns: “CAPEC-21 Exploitation of Session Variables, Resource IDs and other Trusted
Credentials”, “CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)”, “CAPEC 59: Session
Credential Falsification through Prediction” and “CAPEC-196: Session Credential Falsification
through Forging”.
3.2.7 Extending Abuse Cases using selected attack patterns. The selected attack
pattern could be used to extend the abuse case “Impersonate Doctor”. We describe how the
attack pattern “CAPEC-21: Exploitation of Session Variables, Resource IDs and other Trusted
Credentials” is used to extend the abuse case below:
Information displayed in listings 1.1 through 1.3 are excerpts from the attack pattern that
are used for developing the abuse case. Detailed information of the attack pattern can be found
at: http://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/21.html.
1. Objective: To impersonate the doctor and change appointment findings.
Listing 1.1 is an excerpt from the attack pattern and gives a brief idea about the attack
pattern and what it is used for. This listing summarizes the attack pattern and contains
information for crafting the objective of the abuse case in consideration.
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CAPEC-21: Exploitation of Session Variables, Resource IDs and other Trusted
Credentials
Attack Pattern ID: 21
Abstraction: Standard

Status: Draft
Completeness: Complete

Description
Summary
Attacks on session IDs and resource IDs take advantage of the fact that some software accepts
user input without verifying its authenticity. For example, a message queuing system that allows
service requesters to post messages to its queue through an open channel (such as anonymous
FTP), authorization is done through checking group or role membership contained in the posted
message. However, there is no proof that the message itself, the information in the message
(such group or role membership), or indeed the process that wrote the message to the queue are
authentic and authorized to do so.
Many server side processes are vulnerable to these attacks because the server to server
communications have not been analyzed from a security perspective or the processes "trust" other
systems because they are behind a firewall. In a similar way servers that use easy to guess or
spoofable schemes for representing digital identity can also be vulnerable. Such systems
frequently use schemes without cryptography and digital signatures (or with broken
cryptography). Session IDs may be guessed due to insufficient randomness, poor protection
(passed in the clear), lack of integrity (unsigned), or improperly correlation with access control
policy enforcement points.
Exposed configuration and properties files that contain system passwords, database connection
strings, and such may also give an attacker an edge to identify these identifiers.
The net result is that spoofing and impersonation is possible leading to an attacker's ability to
break authentication, authorization, and audit controls on the system.

Listing 1.1. Snippet of the Attack Pattern showing the “Description” field for Crafting
Abuse Case Objective.
Listing 1.2 contains information for creating the following sections of the abuse case.
They may be directly transferred from the attack pattern.
2. Prerequisites: Server software must rely on weak session IDs proof and/or verification
schemes
3. Resource Required: Ability to deploy software on network. Ability to communicate
synchronously or asynchronously with server.
4. Typical Severity: High
5. Likelihood of Exploit: High
6. Attacker Skills Level: Low
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7. Knowledge Required: To achieve a direct connection with the weak or non-existent server
session access control, and pose as an authorized user
Attack Prerequisites


Server software must rely on weak session IDs proof and/or verification schemes

Typical Severity
High

Typical Likelihood of Exploit
Likelihood: High

Attacker Skills or Knowledge Required
Skill or Knowledge Level: Low
To achieve a direct connection with the weak or non-existent server session access control, and
pose as an authorized user

Resources Required
Ability to deploy software on network. Ability to communicate synchronously or asynchronously
with server

Listing 1.2 Snippet that may be Transferred Directly to the Abuse Case
8. Crafting Abusive Interaction: Listing 1.3 the “Attack Execution Flow” part of “Description”
is used for crafting the abusive interaction Abusive interaction is created from part of field of
the attack pattern. The “Example Instance” field of an attack patterns with little “Attack
Execution Flow” information may be inferred to craft the abusive interaction. Basically, any
information the developer deems important should be included in the abusive interaction to
build a strong case.
The “Attack Execution Flow” section typically comprises of “Explore”, “Experiment”
and “Exploit” sections. The “Explore” section may be used for probing the application. The
“Experiment” section might be used for finding out susceptibility to a certain input or query. The
“Exploit” section is used for actually carrying an abuse on the system after the exploration and
experimentation stages are successful. This is used for developing the abusive interaction section
of the abuse case under consideration.
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Attack Execution Flow
Explore

1. Survey the application for Indicators of Susceptibility:
Using a variety of methods, until one is found that applies to the target system. The attacker
probes for credentials, session tokens, or entry points that bypass credentials altogether.

Attack Step Techniques
ID Attack Step Technique Description

Environments

1

Spider all available pages

env-Web

2

Attack known bad interfaces

env-Web env-CommProtocol env-ClientServer envLocal

Experiment

1. Fetch samples:
An attacker fetches many samples of a session ID. This may be through legitimate access
(logging in, legitimate connections, etc.) or just systematic probing.

Attack Step Techniques
ID Attack Step Technique Description

Environments

1

An attacker makes many anonymous connections and records the session
IDs assigned.

2

An attacker makes authorized connections and records the session tokens
or credentials issued.

3

An attacker gains access to (legitimately or illegitimately) a nearby system
(e.g., in the same operations network, DMZ, or local network) and makes
a connections from it, attempting to gain the same privileges as a trusted
system.

env-Web envPeer2Peer envCommProtocol envClientServer
env-Web envPeer2Peer envCommProtocol envClientServer
env-Peer2Peer envCommProtocol envClientServer

Exploit

1. Impersonate:
An attacker can use successful experiments to impersonate an authorized user or system

2. Spoofing:
Bad data can be injected into the system by an attacker.

Listing 1.3 Information for Crafting Abusive Interaction section of Abuse Case
Abusive Interaction. The attacker probes HIS (by spidering all available pages) for
credentials, session tokens, or entry points that bypass credentials altogether and attacking
known bad interfaces. The attacker then fetches many samples of session ids by: 1.) making
many anonymous connections and recording the assigned session ids; 2.) making authorized
connections and recording session tokens or credentials issued; 3.) An attacker gains access to
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(legitimately or illegitimately) a nearby system (e.g., in the same operations network, DMZ, or
local network) and makes a connection from it, attempting to gain the same privileges as a
trusted HIS system.
An attacker who succeeds in compromising the session keys can impersonate the doctor’s
session and have the same capabilities as the doctor. There are two main ways for an attacker to
exploit session IDs.
1.) A brute force attack: involves an attacker repeatedly attempting to query the system with a
spoofed session header in the HTTP request. HIS server might be easily spoofed if it uses a short
session ID by trying many possible combinations so the parameters session-ID= 1234 has few
possible combinations, and an attacker can retry several hundred or thousand request with little
to no issue on their side.
2.) Interception tools such as Wireshark is be used to sniff the wire and pull off any unprotected
session identifiers. The attacker then use these variables to access the HIS application.
9. Post Condition: Attacker successfully exploits session variables and assumes the identity of a
doctor.
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CHAPTER 4
Developing Abuse Cases for a Hospital Information System
This chapter illustrates how attack patterns can be used to extend abuse cases for the
Hospital Information System (HIS). Attack patterns contain much useful information for
developing abuse cases. The extended abuse case includes the following information: objectives,
prerequisites, resource required, typical severity, likelihood of exploit, attacker skills or
knowledge required, abusive interaction and post condition.
To find out how useful a particular attack pattern is for extending the abuse cases, the
following needs to be considered:
1. The objective of the abuse case must correspond to the motivation of the attack pattern.
2. The abuse cases prerequisites in the form of technology being implemented by the system
must tally with the prerequisite required to successfully exploit the system using the attack
pattern.
3. The resource required might be any form of knowledge or resource an attacker might need or
have to be able to exploit the system using the attack pattern. The harder it is for an attacker
to find this resource, the harder it is to abuse the system using this attack pattern.
4. The severity, likelihood of exploit, attacker skills are index properties used to check for
granularity and trim down (by either combining them or removing duplicates altogether) the
list of abuse cases when there seem to be too many attack patterns available for extending a
single abuse case.
5. Abusive interaction is the main description and steps required to attack the system. It gives
information about how to explore the system for variables needed to exploit it and how to
further exploit it when exploration is successful. The “Description” section of an attack
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pattern should contain enough information to develop the abuse, if not, information in the
“Example Instance” section example could be utilized.
In addition to extending the already brainstormed abuse cases, new abuse cases might be
discovered.
The following sections describe the process of developing abuse cases for the HIS. To
keep the scope small, we develop abuse cases for only one use case “Enter Appointment
Findings”. The process illustrated here starts from Step 3 in Figure 1.
4.1 Using SDL Threat Modelling to Generate Keywords for Selecting Attack Patterns
The SDL tool allows us to develop a data flow diagram (DFD) which is then analyzed for
threats. The tool possesses a feature, “Certify that there are no threats of this type”, that allows
users to consider if the threats exist in the system or not. To certify that the threat is not present,
the user chooses a reason from a list whether the risk is within a trust boundary, mitigated
elsewhere in the system or accepted. Table 3 summarizes the threats that pertain to each element
and the keywords that were extracted from the questions generated by SDL to address the threat.
Table 3
Generated Keywords from Questions provided by SDL Tool for each Element and Threats
Elements

Threats
Spoofing

Keywords
spoofing, credentials, key, cryptography, password, and
authentication

Doctor
Repudiation

repudiation, digital signature, timestamp, sequence, log
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Table 3
Cont.
Tampering

Tamper, bits, dataflow, duplicate, overlap, authenticate, keys,
validate, cryptographic, integrity

Data Flows
Information

disclosure, information, authenticate, keys, validate,

Disclosure

cryptographic

Spoofing

spoofing, credentials, key, cryptography, password, and
authentication

Findings
Process

Elevation of

Elevation, privilege, alter, execution, code, validate, same

Privilege

origin, LinkDemand, .NET, verification

Tampering

tamper, alter, data, store, access, resources, datastore, wrap,
discard

Findings
Data store

Information

information, disclosure, access, data, encrypt, channel,

Disclosure

recovery, storage

4.2 Searching Attack Patterns using Keywords
TrAP is ran to categorize and rank attack patterns under STRIDE. Under each category,
the keywords in Table 3 from section 4.1 above are input one after the other to search for
relevant attack patterns. These attack patterns are most related to the threats which pertain to the
system as suggested by the SDL tool. The attack patterns are copied in a table and a further
selection is done to choose the ones to use for developing the abuse cases. Keywords may also
include any technology implemented by the system and can be crafted by the developer to
address the security need of the system. In our case, we only limit our keywords to the ones
extracted from the questions generated by SDL.
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The attack patterns retrieved using keywords in table 3 are listed in the Appendix. The
selected attack patterns for developing each abuse case are listed in table 4.
Table 4
Objective Mapping of Applicable Attack Patterns from List of Retrieved Attack Patterns to
Elements and Threats.
Elements

Threats

ID

Attack Pattern

Enter &

Information

94

Man in the Middle Attack

Retrieve

Disclosure

Findings

&

31

Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies

Data Flows

Tampering
Exploitation of Session Variables; Resource IDs and

Doctor

21

other Trusted Credentials

49

Password Brute Forcing

98

Phishing

Spoofing

Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control
Elevation of

180 Security Levels

Findings
Privilege

Information
Findings

Disclosure

Data store

&
Tampering

Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by
1

ACLs

66

SQL Injection

139 Relative Path Traversal
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4.3 Selecting Attack Patterns for Extending the Brainstormed Abuse Cases
Table 4 presents a fairly large list of attack patterns. Most of these attack patterns are
related to each other with fewer variations. The keywords search retrieve attack patterns that may
not be very useful in a particular situation, likewise, the keyword search might miss some attack
patterns that are very vital for certain abuse cases. The search may also retrieve attack patterns
that show little relevance in terms of information it entails. Manually going through the list of
attack patterns retrieved by TrAP to select attack patterns is a best practice after keyword search
has been completed. The manual searching process helps capture attack patterns missed by
keyword search.
Table 5 maps elements to abuse cases to show elements that stand the highest chance of
abuse. The findings process was excluded because it does not have a match with any of the abuse
cases. Mapped attack patterns will be used to extend the abuse cases they are mapped to.
Table 5
Mapping Attack Patterns and Abuse Cases to Applicable Respective Elements
Elements

Abuse Case

ID

Attack Pattern

Enter & Retrieve

Intercept

94

Man in the Middle Attack

Findings Data Flows

and Analyze

(E, R)

Data

Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP
31

Cookies
Exploitation of Session Variables; Resource IDs

Impersonate

21

and other Trusted Credentials

Doctor

49

Password Brute Forcing

98

Phishing

Doctor (D)
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Table 5
Cont.
Findings

–

–

–

Change

66

SQL Injection

Doctor’s

139

Relative Path Traversal

Findings

193

PHP Remote File Inclusion

Findings Data store
(FD)

4.4 Extending Abuse Cases with selected Attack Patterns
After the selection process, we extend our abuse cases using the selected attack patterns.
Our abuse case is “Change Doctor’s Findings” and it includes two intermediary abuse cases:
“Intercept and Analyze Packets” and “Impersonate Doctor”. To change the doctor’s findings,
one has to be able to assume the role of the doctor. This can be done through either an external
attacker spoofing the doctor or causing some level of elevation of privilege if they happen to be
users of the HIS system. The attacker might need to intercept data packets on the wire and
analyze them as an intermediate step to impersonate the doctor. Our assumption is that a
successful impersonation will give the attacker enough privileges to change the doctor’s
findings.
4.4.1 Extending “Intercept and Analyze Data” Abuse Case with the selected Attack
Patterns. The main objective of this abuse varies from disclosing some secured information to
tampering the information to perform further attack. For the purpose of this research, we assume
that information within the trust boundary is secured from interception. In this case, data coming
from the doctor such as credentials, can easily be captured for further analysis. This limits our
threats scope to tampering and information disclosure threats. We will select attack patterns
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relating to data flow from the doctor into the HIS system. Majority attack patterns inherently
exploit the system to disclose sensitive information to assist in further attacks.
Information passing from doctor (client) to HIS server can be disclosed. Before
tampering is done, there has to be some form of information disclosure. This information may be
relevant for a later attack such as impersonating the doctor from captured credentials.
Information disclosure of this nature is mostly a prerequisite for tampering and is always a sub
motivation for tampering.
In reference to table 5, the most relevant attack patterns for tampering are: “CAPEC-94:
Man in the Middle Attack” and “CAPEC-31: Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies”.
These attack patterns would be used to extend the “Intercept and Analyze Packets” abuse case.
As a result, two child abuse cases are generated (see figure 9): “Using Man-in-the-Middle to
Intercept and Analyze Data” and “Intercept and Analyze HTTP Cookies”.
4.4.1.1 Abuse Case: “Using Man-in-the-Middle Attack to Intercept and Analyze Data”
Objectives. Attacker places himself in the communication channel between server and client to
intercept and modify data passing from client to server and vice versa.
Prerequisites: Server software must rely on weak session IDs proof and/or verification schemes
Resource Required: None
Typical Severity: High
Likelihood of Exploit: High
Attacker Skills or Knowledge Required: Level - Low
Abusive Interaction: The attacker probes HIS to determine the nature and mechanism of
communication between the client and server looking for opportunities to exploit. He then inserts
himself into the communication channel initially acting as a routing proxy between the client and
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the server. The attacker may or may not have to use cryptography. He observes, filters or alters
passed data of its choosing to gain access to change the appointment findings coming from the
doctor to the server.
Post Condition: Attacker places himself between doctor and HIS server and changes
appointment findings.
Solutions and Mitigations:


HIS should use a public key signed by a certificate authority



HIS communication should be encrypted using cryptography (SSL)



HIS should Use strong mutual authentication to always fully authenticate both client and
server.



HIS should exchange public keys using a secure channel
4.4.1.2 Abuse Case: “Intercept and Analyze HTTP Cookies”

Objectives: Intercept, modify and forward HTTP cookies to server to gain access to HIS.
Prerequisites: Target server software must be a HTTP daemon that relies on cookies.
Resource Required: Ability to send HTTP request containing cookie to server
Typical Severity: High
Likelihood of Exploit: High
Attacker Skills or Knowledge Required:
Skill Level 1: Low
Knowledge Required 1: To overwrite session cookie data, and submit targeted attacks via HTTP
Skill Level 2: High
Knowledge Required 2: Exploiting a remote buffer overflow generated by attack
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Abusive Interaction: The attacker first obtains a copy of the cookie. The attacker may be a
legitimate end user wanting to escalate privilege, or could be somebody sniffing on a network to
get a copy of HTTP cookies.
Steps:
1. Obtain cookie from local filesystem (e.g. C:\Documents and Settings\*\Cookies and
C:\Documents and Settings\*\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.txt in
Windows)
2. Sniff cookie using a network sniffer such as Wireshark
3. Obtain cookie from local memory or filesystem using a utility such as the Firefox Cookie
Manager or AnEC Cookie Editor.
4. Steal cookie via a cross-site scripting attack.
5. Guess cookie contents if it contains predictable information.
The attacker may be able to get doctor from the cookie. HIS assumes that cookies are not
accessible by end users, and have potentially sensitive information in them.
Steps:
1. If cookie shows any signs of being encoded using a standard scheme such as base64, decode
it.
2. Analyze the cookie's contents to determine whether it contains any sensitive information.
The attacker may be able to modify or replace cookies to bypass security controls in the
application.
Steps:
1. Modify logical parts of cookie and send it back to server to observe the effects.
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2. Modify numeric parts of cookie arithmetically and send it back to server to observe the
effects.
3. Modify cookie bitwise and send it back to server to observe the effects.
4. Replace cookie with an older legitimate cookie and send it back to server to observe the
effects. This technique would be helpful in cases where the cookie contains a "points
balance" for a given user where the points have some value. The user may spend his points
and then replace his cookie with an older one to restore his balance.
Post Condition: Attacker successfully subverts security controls on HIS server
Solutions and Mitigations:


Design: Use input validation for cookies



Design: Generate and validate MAC (Message Authentication Code) for cookies



Implementation: Use SSL/TLS to protect cookie in transit



Implementation: Ensure HIS server implements all relevant security patches, many
exploitable buffer overflows are fixed in patches issued for the software.
4.4.2 Extending “Impersonate Doctor” Abuse Case with the selected Attack

Patterns. To impersonate the doctor, an attacker might spoof the login process. The main
motivation of this attacker might be limited to assuming identity, however, he can further exploit
the system by performing tampering, information disclosure, or denial of service attacks.
In spoofing a doctor, the attacker is trying to assume the identity of a doctor. He does so by
launching a number of attacks to first probe the system and then attack the authentication
scheme. There are several attack patterns that can be used to build spoofing abuse cases to
impersonate a valid user. We select three to extend the “Impersonate Doctor” abuse case:
“CAPEC-21: Exploitation of Session Variables, Resource IDs and other Trusted Credentials”;
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“CAPEC-49: Password Brute Forcing” and “CAPEC-98: Phishing”. As a result, the following
child abuse cases were formed (see figure 9): “Spoof Doctor through Session Exploitation”,
“Spoof Doctor through Password Brute Forcing”, and “Spoof Doctor through Phishing”.
4.4.2.1 Abuse Case: “Spoof Doctor through Session Exploitation”
Objectives: To impersonate the doctor and change appointment findings.
Prerequisites: Server software must rely on weak session IDs proof and/or verification schemes
Resource Required: Ability to deploy software on network. Ability to communicate
synchronously or asynchronously with server.
Typical Severity: High
Likelihood of Exploit: High
Attacker Skills Level: Low
Knowledge Required: To achieve a direct connection with the weak or non-existent server
session access control, and pose as an authorized user
Abusive Interaction: The attacker probes HIS (by spidering all available pages) for credentials,
session tokens, or entry points that bypass credentials altogether and attacking known bad
interfaces. The attacker then fetches many samples of session ids by: 1.) making many
anonymous connections and recording the assigned session ids; 2.) making authorized
connections and recording session tokens or credentials issued; 3.) An attacker gains access
(legitimately or illegitimately) to a nearby system (e.g., in the same operations network, DMZ, or
local network) and makes a connection from it, attempting to gain the same privileges as a
trusted HIS system.
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An attacker who succeeds in compromising the session keys can impersonate the doctor’s
session and have the same capabilities as the doctor. There are two main ways for an attacker to
exploit session IDs.
1.) A brute force attack involves an attacker repeatedly attempting to query the system with a
spoofed session header in the HTTP request. A web server that uses a short session ID can be
easily spoofed by trying many possible combinations so the parameters session-ID= 1234 has
few possible combinations, and an attacker can retry several hundred or thousand request with
little to no issue on their side.
2.) Interception tools such as Wireshark is be used to sniff the wire and pull off any unprotected
session identifiers. The attacker then use these variables to access the HIS application.
Post Condition: Attacker spoofs session ID and assumes doctor’s identity to change appointment
findings.
4.4.2.2 Abuse Case: “Spoof Doctor through Password Brute Forcing”
Objectives: To impersonate an authorized the doctor
Prerequisites:


An attacker needs to know the doctor’s username.



The system uses password based authentication as the one factor authentication mechanism.



An application does not have a password throttling mechanism in place. A good password
throttling mechanism will make it almost impossible computationally to brute force a
password as it may either lock out the user after a certain number of incorrect attempts or
introduce time out periods. Both of these would make a brute force attack impractical.

Resource Required: A powerful enough computer for the job with sufficient CPU, RAM and
HD. Exact requirements will depend on the size of the brute force job and the time requirement
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for completion. Some brute forcing jobs may require grid or distributed computing (e.g. DES
Challenge).
Typical Severity: High
Likelihood of Exploit: Medium
Skills Level: Low
Knowledge Required: A brute force attack is very straightforward. A variety of password
cracking tools are widely available.
Abusive Interaction: The attacker tries to determine the password policies of HIS by
determining: 1.) the minimum and maximum password lengths allowed; 2.) the formats of
allowed passwords (whether they are allowed or required to contain special characters or
numbers); 3.) Account lockout policy (a strict account lockout policy will prevent brute force
attacks). Given the finite space of possible passwords dictated by the password policy
determined in the previous step, the attacker tries all possible passwords for a known doctor’s
user ID until application/system grants access by: 1.) Manually or automatically entering all
possible passwords through HIS's interface. Start with the shortest and simplest possible
passwords, because if allowed to do so, most users tend to select such passwords; 2.) Performing
an offline dictionary attack or a rainbow table attack against a known password hash.
Post Condition: Attacker determines correct password for a doctor’s user ID and obtains access
to the HIS system.
4.4.2.3 Abuse Case: “Spoof Doctor through Phishing”
Objectives: Attacker (https://www.Heatlh.com) masquerades as HIS (https://www.Health.com)
and does business with doctor, gathers credentials and then logs in as the doctor.
Prerequisites:
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An attacker needs to have a way to initiate contact with the victim. Typically that will happen
through e-mail.



An attacker needs to correctly guess the entity (HIS) with which the doctor does business and
impersonate it.



An attacker needs to have a sufficiently compelling call to action to prompt the doctor to take
action.



The replicated website needs to look extremely similar to the original HIS website and the
URL used to get to that website needs to look like the real URL of the HIS system.

Resource Required: Some web development tools to put up a fake website.
Typical Severity: Very High
Likelihood of Exploit: High
Attacker Skills: Medium
Abusive Interaction: An attacker creates https://www.Heatlh.com which resembles
https://www.Health.com, the HIS website that he is trying to impersonate. The attacker’s website
has a login form for the victim to put in his authentication credentials.
Steps:
1.

Attacker spiders http://www.Health.com to get copies of web pages.

2.

He manually saves copies of required web pages from Health.com.

3.

Attacker then creates new web pages that have the https://www.Health.com’s look and feel,
but contain completely new content.
The attacker sends an e-mail to the doctor about a possible login abuse action against HIS

website (https://www.Health.com) by placing the link https://Heatlh.com/suspicious_activity.php
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in the email. Once the doctor clicks on the link included in the e-mail pointing to the attacker’s
website, he is required to change his password and his credentials are compromised.
Steps:
1.

Send the doctor a message from a spoofed legitimate-looking e-mail address that asks him to
click on the included link.

2.

Place phishing link in post to online forum.

Post Condition: Once the attacker captures these login credentials through phishing, he can
leverage this information by logging into HIS to change the doctor’s appointment findings.
4.4.3 Extending “Change Doctor’s Findings” Abuse Case with the selected Attack
Patterns. “Impersonate Doctor” and “Intercept and Analyze Data” are sub-abuse cases of
“Change Doctor’s Findings” abuse case. The main motivation of the attacker to manipulate the
findings might first be to gain privileges as doctor or to disclose information, analyze the bits and
tamper it.
To tamper with the doctor’s findings, an attacker might try to directly get access to the
file that the findings data are saved in and then change them. Tampering affects the integrity of
the data through forgery. The attack patterns: “CAPEC-66: SQL Injection”; “CAPEC-139:
Relative Path Traversal” and “CAPEC-193: Remote File Inclusion” are selected for extending
the “Change Doctor’s Findings” abuse case. As a result, three child abuse cases are formed (see
figure 9): “Change Findings Using SQL Injection”, “Change Findings through Path Traversal”
and “Change Findings through File Inclusion”.
4.4.3.1 Abuse Case: “Change Findings Using SQL Injection”
Objectives: To bypass the application completely to talk directly to the database, causing
information disclosure and granting ability to modify data in the findings database.
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Prerequisites:


SQL queries used by HIS application to store, retrieve or modify data.



User-controllable input that is not properly validated by the HIS application as part of SQL
queries.

Typical Severity: High
Likelihood of Exploit: Very High
Skill Level: Low
Knowledge Required: It is fairly simple for someone with basic SQL knowledge to perform SQL
injection, in general. In certain instances, however, specific knowledge of the database employed
may be required.
Abusive Interaction: First take an inventory of the functionality exposed by HIS.
Steps:
1. Spider HIS web sites for all available links
2. Sniff network communications with HIS application using a utility such as Wireshark.
Determine the user-controllable input susceptible to injection. For each user-controllable input
suspected to be vulnerable to SQL injection, attempt to inject characters that have special
meaning in SQL (such as a single quote character, a double quote character, two hyphens, a
parenthesis, etc.). The goal is to create a SQL query with an invalid syntax.
Steps:
1. Use web browser to inject input through text fields or through HTTP GET parameters.
2. Use a web application debugging tool such as Tamper Data, TamperIE, WebScarab,etc. to
modify HTTP POST parameters, hidden fields, non-freeform fields, etc.
3. Use network-level packet injection tools such as netcat to inject input
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4. Use modified client (modified by reverse engineering) to inject input.
After determining that a given input is vulnerable to SQL Injection, hypothesize what the
underlying query looks like. Iteratively try to add logic to the query to extract and modify
information in the findings database.
Steps:
1. Use public resources such as "SQL Injection Cheat Sheet" at
http://ferruh.mavituna.com/makale/sql-injection-cheatsheet/, and try different approaches for
adding logic to SQL queries.
2. Add logic to query, and use detailed error messages from the server to debug the query. For
example, if adding a single quote to a query causes an error message, try : "' OR 1=1; --", or
something else that would syntactically complete a hypothesized query. Iteratively refine the
query.
3. Use "Blind SQL Injection" techniques to extract information about the database schema.
Post Condition: Attacker achieves goal of unauthorized system access to change doctor’s
appointment findings.
Solutions and Mitigations:


Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be validated and filtered for illegal
characters as well as SQL content. Keywords such as UNION, SELECT or INSERT must be
filtered in addition to characters such as a single-quote (') or SQL-comments (--) based on the
context in which they appear.



Use of parameterized queries or stored procedures - Parameterization causes the input to be
restricted to certain domains, such as strings or integers, and any input outside such domains
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is considered invalid and the query fails. Note that SQL Injection is possible even in the
presence of stored procedures if the eventual query is constructed dynamically.


Use of custom error pages - Attackers can glean information about the nature of queries from
descriptive error messages. Input validation must be coupled with customized error pages
that inform about an error without disclosing information about the database or application.
4.4.3.2 Abuse Case: “Change Findings through Path Traversal”

Objectives: An attacker bypasses input validation on HIS by supplying a specially constructed
path utilizing dot and slash characters for the purpose of obtaining access to findings database
file and changing doctor’s findings.
Prerequisites: The HIS application must accept a string as user input, fail to sanitize
combinations of characters in the input that have a special meaning in the context of path
navigation, and insert the user-supplied string into path navigation commands.
Typical Severity: High
Likelihood of Exploit: High
Attacker Skills or Knowledge Required:
Skill Level 1: Low
Knowledge Required 1: To inject the malicious payload in a web page
Skill Level 2: High
Knowledge Required 2: To bypass non trivial filters in the application
Resources Required: None
Abusive Interaction: Using a browser or an automated tool, follow all public links on HIS web
site, record all the links found and pick out the URL parameters that may related to access to
files.
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Steps:
1. Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links. Make special note of any links that
include parameters in the URL.
2. Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.
Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL. Manual traversal of this
type is frequently necessary to identify forms that are GET method forms rather than POST
forms.
3. Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many
browsers plug-ins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the URL discovery.
Possibly using an automated tool, request variations on the identified inputs and send
parameters that include variations of payloads.
Steps:
1. Use a list of probe strings as path traversal payload. Different strings may be used for
different platforms. Strings contain relative path sequences such as "../".
2. Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of relative path traversal probes in known
URLs.
Inject path traversal syntax into identified vulnerable inputs to cause inappropriate
reading, writing or execution of findings data file. A successful attack allows reading HIS
directories or files which we would not normally be allowed to read. The attacker could also
access data outside the web document root, or include scripts, source code and other kinds of
files from external websites. Once there is access to the findings data file, the doctor findings is
modified.
Steps:
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1. Manipulate findings data file and its path by injecting relative path sequences (e.g. "../").
2. Download findings data file, and modify the file
Post Condition: The attacker accesses the content findings data store and modifies the doctor’s
appointment findings.
Solutions and Mitigations:


Design: Input validation. Assume that user inputs are malicious. Utilize strict type, character,
and encoding enforcement



Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content, including remote and usergenerated content.



Implementation: Validate user input by only accepting known good. Ensure all content that is
delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification -- whitelisting
approach.



Implementation: Prefer working without user input when using file system calls



Implementation: Use indirect references rather than actual file names.



Implementation: Use possible permissions on file access when developing and deploying
web applications.
4.4.3.3 Abuse Case: “Change Findings through File Inclusion”

Objectives: To control an improperly sanitized "include" or "require" call through an insecurely
configured PHP runtime environment to point to findings data store file to load and execute
arbitrary code remotely available from HIS to change doctor’s findings.
Prerequisites: HIS application server must allow remote files to be included in the "require",
"include", etc. PHP directives
Typical Severity: High
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Likelihood of Exploit: High
Attacker Skills or Knowledge Required:
Skill Level 1: Low
Knowledge Required 1: To inject the malicious payload in a web page
Skill Level 2: Medium
Knowledge Required 2: To bypass filters in the application
Resources Required: Ability to send HTTP request to a web application. Ability to store PHP
scripts on a server
Abusive Interaction: Using a browser or an automated tool, an attacker follows all public links
on HIS web site. He records all the links he finds.
Steps:
1. Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links. Make special note of any links that
include parameters in the URL.
2. Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.
Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL. Manual traversal of this
type is frequently necessary to identify forms that are GET method forms rather than POST
forms.
3. Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many
browser's plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the URL discovery.
The attack variants make use of a remotely available PHP script that generates a uniquely
identifiable output when executed on the target application server. Possibly using an automated
tool, request variations on the inputs surveyed before. Send parameters that include variations of
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payloads which include a reference to the remote PHP script. Record all the responses from the
server that include the output of the execution of remote PHP script.
Steps:
1. Use a list of probe strings to inject in parameters of known URLs. The probe strings are
variants of PHP remote file inclusion payloads which include a reference to the attackers'
controlled remote PHP script.
2. Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of remote file inclusion probes in known
URLs.
Success in exploiting the vulnerability, enables execution of server-side code within the
application. The malicious code has virtual access to the same resources as the HIS application.
If required, include shell code in the script to execute commands on the server under the same
privileges as the PHP runtime is running with.
Steps:
1. Malicious PHP script that is injected through vectors identified during previous phase and
executed by the application server to execute a custom PHP script.
Post Condition: The attacker's script is executed on the HIS server.
Solutions and Mitigations:


Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content, including remote and usergenerated content



Implementation: Only allow known files to be included (whitelist)



Implementation: Make use of indirect references passed in URL parameters instead of file
names
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Configuration: Ensure that remote scripts cannot be include in the "include" or "require" PHP
directives
Figure 9 provides an overview of all the child abuse cases generated through extending

the initial brainstormed abuse cases.
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Figure 9. Child Abuse Cases revealed after Extending Brainstormed Ones
4.5 Finding New Abuse Cases
Figure 9 shows abuse cases revealed after extending the brainstormed ones. After
extending the abuse cases, we discovered new abuse cases, namely: “Repudiate Doctor”,
“Impersonate Findings Process” and “Enter Appointment Findings as Nurse”.
SDL analysis shows us that a doctor can be impersonated and/or repudiated against. The
abuse case “Repudiate Doctor” is when another doctor is able to enter or change appointment
findings s another doctor and totally deny doing so. “Impersonate Findings Process” allows an
attacker to place himself as a trusted findings process of HIS. He then collects all appointment
findings coming from doctor, modifies it and forwards it to the HIS server. A nurse has the role
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to enter preliminary appointment information in HIS (Pauli & Xu, 2005). In the abuse case
“Enter Appointment Findings as Nurse”, the attacker elevates the privileges of the nurse’s
process by bypassing the ACL’s confining the findings process to only the doctor users of HIS.
If there are ACL’s protecting various elements or the mechanism is weak, the attacker leverages
the vulnerability to perform this attack.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion and Future Research
Attack patterns are gaining attention in both research and usage in the secure software
development field. This research provides an approach for utilizing CAPEC attack patterns for
developing abuse cases. The most useful attack patterns are the most informative and relevant for
the system under development. It is not an easy exercise however, to find relevant attack patterns
from the CAPEC library which might be useful enough for developing abuse cases. A Tool for
Retrieving Attack Patterns (TrAP) was developed to make it easier to retrieve relevant attack
patterns from CAPEC library.
An abuse case developer should be able to think about rigorous actions against the
software under development. We proposed a systematic method to use relevant CAPEC attack
patterns for developing abuse cases.
This method utilizes attack patterns to develop abuse cases using Microsoft SDL threat
modelling to aid the selection of most relevant attack patterns. The methodology follows the
following process: 1.) develop use and abuse cases form software architecture documentation; 2.)
decompose the software into elements and run SDL threat modelling analysis to model threats in
the various elements; 3.) extract keywords from questions generated for STRIDE threat types by
SDL tool; 4.) use keywords to search for attack patterns in the TrAP tool based on STRIDE
threat types; 5.) select relevant attack patterns from the search results and extend abuse cases
using information contained in the attack patterns.
After searching for the attack patterns, the list should be checked ensure solid abuse cases
are built from the most relevant attack patterns retrieved. Key word search might retrieve related
attack patterns or patterns that are related to each other, but might have motivations that vary
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slightly form the objectives of the abuse case. This following process should be followed to
select relevant attack patterns: 1.) compares the attack motivation of the attack patterns to the
objective of the abuse case to make sure they match; 2.) checks for special technology
implemented in the software against the attack prerequisites of the attack patterns to make sure
attack prerequisites are not obsolete; 3.) checks the resources required by the attack pattern to
view its viability to be practical enough for developing abuse cases; 4.) checks the attacker skills
needed to exploit the software to see the level of skill and knowledge might be required to
exploit software using the pattern; 5.) checks likelihood of exploit and severity of attack to find
out how the attack pattern is suited for building a well-grounded abuse case for the software
being developed.
The challenges developers might face adopting this methodology is generating keywords
for searching attack patterns. Since the same questions might be asked for the same threat
pertaining to various elements, this might present a limitation of use of the retrieved/selected
attack patterns. To subvert this challenge however, developers should scan through the list of
retrieved attack patterns to manually search for relevant attack patterns by STRIDE threat type.
The manually searched attack patterns should be combined with the ones searched using the
keywords to remove duplicates. Attack patterns should then be selected from the combined list to
develop the abuse cases. Also, in the case where many similar attack patterns can be used for
developing the same abuse case, deciding between combing information from one or more attack
patterns or choosing an attack pattern over the other might pose as a difficult challenge. Users
should be familiar with CAPEC attack patterns and Microsoft SDL in order to apply this
methodology successfully.
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Our future work will focus on using attack patterns for architectural risk analysis, design,
and developing test cases.
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Appendix
List of attack patterns retrieved under Spoofing threat using keyword search in TrAP.
CAPEC
ID

Attack Pattern Name

21

Exploitation of Session Variables; Resource IDs and other Trusted Credentials

60

Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)

59

Session Credential Falsification through Prediction

37

Lifting Data Embedded in Client Distributions

196

Session Credential Falsification through Forging

98

Phishing

107

Cross Site Tracing

57

Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Register Man in the Middle

205

Lifting credential(s)/key material embedded in client distributions (thick or thin)

90

Reflection Attack in Authentication Protocol

70

Try Common(default) Usernames and Passwords

199

Cross-Site Scripting Using Alternate Syntax

69

Target Programs with Elevated Privileges

68

Subvert Code-signing Facilities

97

Cryptanalysis

112

Brute Force

49

Password Brute Forcing

55

Rainbow Table Password Cracking

16

Dictionary-based Password Attack
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List of attack patterns retrieved under Spoofing threat using keyword search in TrAP.
Cont.
50

Password Recovery Exploitation

57

Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Register Man in the Middle

114

Authentication Abuse

11

Cause Web Server Misclassification

136

LDAP Injection

83

XPath Injection

39

Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens

22

Exploiting Trust in Client (aka Make the Client Invisible)

207

Removing Important Functionality from the Client

5

Analog In-band Switching Signals (aka Blue Boxing)

List of attack patterns retrieved under Elevation of Privilege threat using keyword search in
TrAP.
CAPEC Attack Pattern Name
ID
66

SQL Injection

84

XQuery Injection

275

DNS Rebinding

180

Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels

77

Manipulating User-Controlled Variables

110

SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering

1

Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs

60
List of attack patterns retrieved under Elevation of Privilege threat using keyword search in
TrAP.
Cont.
10

Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables

104

Cross Zone Scripting

86

Embedding Script (XSS ) in HTTP Headers

135

Format String Injection

6

Argument Injection

107

Cross Site Tracing

4

Using Alternative IP Address Encodings

34

HTTP Response Splitting

92

Forced Integer Overflow

57

Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Register Man in the Middle

21

Exploitation of Session Variables; Resource IDs and other Trusted Credentials

163

Spear Phishing

35

Leverage Executable Code in Nonexecutable Files

22

Exploiting Trust in Client (aka Make the Client Invisible)

62

Cross Site Request Forgery (aka Session Riding)

23

File System Function Injection; Content Based

237

Calling Signed Code From Another Language Within A Sandbox Allow This

207

Removing Important Functionality from the Client

65

Passively Sniff and Capture Application Code Bound for Authorized Client

61
List of attack patterns retrieved under Elevation of Privilege threat using keyword search in
TrAP.
Cont.
259

Passively Sniffing and Capturing Application Code Bound for an Authorized Client
During Patching

187

Malicious Automated Software Update

177

Create files with the same name as files protected with a higher classification

256

Resource Manipulation

122

Exploitation of Authorization

List of attack patterns retrieved under Information Disclosure and Tampering threats using
keyword search in TrAP.
CAPEC
ID

Attack Pattern Name

66

SQL Injection

275

DNS Rebinding

51

Poison Web Service Registry

136

LDAP Injection

267

Leverage Alternate Encoding

110

SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering

87

Forceful Browsing

31

Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies

21

Exploitation of Session Variables; Resource IDs and other Trusted Credentials

62
List of attack patterns retrieved under Information Disclosure and Tampering threats using
keyword search in TrAP.
Cont.
7

Blind SQL Injection

37

Lifting Data Embedded in Client Distributions

83

XPath Injection

86

Embedding Script (XSS ) in HTTP Headers

6

Argument Injection

101

Server Side Include (SSI) Injection

163

Spear Phishing

196

Session Credential Falsification through Forging

98

Phishing

222

iFrame Overlay

219

XML Routing Detour Attacks

107

Cross Site Tracing

58

Restful Privilege Elevation

91

XSS in IMG Tags

132

Symlink Attack

205

Lifting credential(s)/key material embedded in client distributions (thick or thin)

48

Passing Local Filenames to Functions That Expect a URL

95

WSDL Scanning

12

Choosing a Message/Channel Identifier on a Public/Multicast Channel

11

Cause Web Server Misclassification

63
List of attack patterns retrieved under Information Disclosure and Tampering threats using
keyword search in TrAP.
Cont.
111

JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)

65

Passively Sniff and Capture Application Code Bound for Authorized Client
Passively Sniffing and Capturing Application Code Bound for an Authorized Client

259

During Patching

18

Embedding Scripts in Nonscript Elements

170

Web Server/Application Fingerprinting

215

Fuzzing and observing application log data/errors for application mapping

169

Footprinting

121

Locate and Exploit Test APIs

112

Brute Force

